Abstract. We present protocols for enhancing e-mail systems to allow for secure revocation of messages. This paper identi es the security requirements for e-mail revocation and then shows how our protocols adhere to these requirements. Three di erent levels of security and threat models are described. We discuss our implementation of the level 1 protocol, which assumes no security infrastructure. The protocols were designed so that existing mailers can easily be enhanced with these new features.
Introduction
In the early days of the Internet, the use of electronic mail (e-mail) was limited to a small subset of highly technical people. It was a luxury that was not enjoyed by the rest of the population, and most people had never even heard of it. In spite of the small number of users of e-mail, the protocols (namely, smtp 11] and X.400 3]) were highly reliable. Users could assume that if a message was sent, then either it would be received, or they would be noti ed that the transmission failed. In recent years, the use of e-mail spread to the general population. In spite of the tremendous increase in the number of users, the robustness and reliability of e-mail is still taken for granted. This is a result of standards for how e-mail is sent, received and processed. These standards make e-mail a convenient and reliable means of communication, but they also make it di cult to change email or to add features. In this paper, we propose a feature that can be added to e-mail without requiring changes to the underlying protocols. Any user wishing to enable this feature must enhance his mail software, with minor modi cations.
It would be nice if e-mail systems enjoyed the same functionality as the US postal system, but it turns out that they don't quite measure up. We did some digging, and discovered a little-known post o ce procedure 16]. It turns out that if you mail a letter or a package to someone, and it then becomes important to you that they not receive it, then there is a way to stop it. It can even be done by phone. The local postmaster contacts the postmaster at the destination and alerts him about the recall. The letter is intercepted and returned to you. The procedure will only work if you provided a return address and a proper description of the envelope or package. It is a federal o ense to lie during the mail recall procedure.
If the US post o ce implements revocation, then it seems that such a service would be desirable in e-mail as well. However, the electronic equivalent of the mail recall form is non-obvious. We use several examples to illustrate why revocation is useful.
Take the following typical scenario (which actually occurred). Alice asks her secretary, Bob, to register her for a conference, where participation is limited. One week before the conference, Alice calls to con rm her registration, because she never received a con rmation. The conference organizer tells Alice that she is not registered. Alice tries to call Bob, but he is away on his lunch break. So, Alice sends a sharp e-mail message to Bob asking why he did not make the reservation. 20 minutes later, the phone rings. It is the conference organizer saying that there had been a mistake and that Alice's registration had been received on time. Alice must send an apology to Bob. Later that day, Bob reads his e-mail. First, he sees the sharp note from Alice, and he sends a long, detailed response about how he took care of everything, and that Alice should not be so quick to blame him when things go wrong. After sending that message, Bob reads the second message. He then sends an apology to Alice. Relations at the o ce are at an all-time low. The whole problem could have been avoided if Alice had a way of cancelling the rst message she sent before Bob returned from lunch. In most current e-mail systems, there is no way to do this without contacting a system administrator or breaking into someone's account.
A second scenario also occurs quite often, and most readers should be familiar with this type of event. Charlie is in charge of a meeting for his entire department of 25 people. He sends out a broadcast message using an e-mail alias announcing that the meeting will be at noon on Friday. An hour later, he gets an e-mail response from a member of the department reminding him that Friday is the company picnic, and that the department is playing another department in the company softball nals. The CEO of the company is the umpire, and so Charlie must reschedule. He immediately sends out another broadcast message announcing that the meeting has moved to Monday. Over the next two days, Charlie receives messages from people about the softball con ict. These messages are usually followed by apologies saying that the person just saw the second broadcast and never mind. If Charlie had a way to revoke the rst broadcast message for all users who hadn't seen it yet, his mailbox would have been much emptier the rest of the week.
These two scenarios involve people in the same organization. The problem becomes more interesting for users across the Internet. Again, we use a scenario to illustrate. Donna is negotiating a deal to purchase the ACME toy company. Her main contact there is Ed. At 4:55 PM, Donna sends Ed an e-mail message with a bid for $5,000,000. At 5:30, there is no response, so she goes home. That night, she watches the news and hears that Ed is being sued for unpaid child support and that he is extremely desperate for cash. She logs into work from home and checks to see if Ed has received her e-mail yet. She receives con rmation that he hasn't. She revokes the e-mail that she sent earlier and sends a new message with a bid for $3,500,000. The next morning, Ed gets to work at 9:00 and sees the bid from Donna. He immediately accepts it.
The latest scenario is not possible in today's Internet for two reasons. There is no way to nd out if a message has been received, and there is no mechanism for revoking a message. In this paper we present a way to receive a correct notication on the status of a message (received or not received), and a mechanism for revoking a message without leaving any evidence that it was ever sent. The sender will also be able to revoke a message and receive correct noti cation that either the message was revoked without leaving any trace, or that it was received before the revocation completed.
While there are mail systems, such as the Michigan Terminal System (MTS) 8] and Novell GroupWise TM version 4.1 that enable this functionality within a local site, there is no general-purpose system that allows a user to revoke a message to an Internet user with a di erent mail system. Furthermore, these systems do not protect users from eavesdroppers on their networks. For example, in MTS, if a user is able to listen in on another user's communication, say, by listening to ethernet tra c, then he can cause a message sent by that user to be revoked. It is obviously desirable that only the user who sends a message should be able to revoke it.
Finally we note that the ideas and protocols developed in this paper also apply to the domain of news groups. It is desirable to enable a user to revoke a message he posted. Currently there is no mechanism which securely enables users to revoke their postings. As in the E-mail case it is desirable that only the user who posted the message should be allowed to revoke it. Our techniques can be directly applied to securely revoking news postings.
E-mail
To familiarize the reader with our terminology we give a high level overview of electronic mail protocols. A user known as the sender may at any time send mail to another user known as the receiver. When a mail message is sent it is received on the receiver side by a mail user agent or MUA for short. At any point in time the receiver may ask his MUA to deliver all of the new incoming messages. Usually the MUA is implemented as a daemon running on some server. When new mail is sent to one of the server's clients the MUA stores the incoming message in a spool le. The receiver can read his incoming messages by instructing the MUA to send him the contents of the spool le.
The MUA is composed of two components. The rst handles the reception and storage of incoming mail messages. The second delivers messages to the receiver on demand. There are two categories of mail systems. In the rst type of system, users can receive their e-mail only by interacting with a limited interface provided by the MUA. Internet service providers such as America Online, Prodigy, Compuserve, etc. fall into this category. In the second type of system, users can bypass the MUA and have direct access to their e-mail. This is often the case in Unix, where users can use the mail program, or they can access their mail directly by reading a spool le. We will call the rst type of system the Limited Interface Model (LIM) and the second type the Direct Access Model (DAM). Figure 1 demonstrates a typical LIM e-mail system. For the LIM model, we view the MUA as one unit. It receives and stores messages and then delivers them to the user on demand. In the DAM model, these two processes are quite di erent. A process with higher privilege than most users, called the mail daemon, handles the receipt of incoming messages. These are stored in a spool le according to the permissions of each user so that users can access their own mail, but not the mail of others. At this point, users can access their mail through a mail reading program or directly through the spool le. In Unix, the mail daemon runs with root privileges so that it can store messages such that they are owned by di erent users. Thus, the mail daemon is a \trusted" program. We will make use of this fact in our protocols.
Our enhancements to the mail system require some changes to the MUA. Since the MUA is totally out of the user's control in the LIM model, it is easy to prevent the user from bypassing our enhancements. Furthermore, in this model our enhancements can be made transparent to the user. In the DAM model, only the daemon can be secured. Access to the mail messages must be controlled through encryption once the messages are stored.
The following are requirements for the new e-mail system. In the following list, we assume that Alice has sent message M to Bob, Charlie is a malicious eavesdropper who can forge message from Alice or Bob, and Donna is a sophisticated attacker who can modify messages in transit and has complete control of all tra c. We also assume that there is a delay, , for a query to travel from Alice to Bob, a delay , for a response to travel from Bob to Alice, and a negligible processing time for queries. We say that Bob read M if Bob requests M from his MUA. Obviously, there is no way to determine if Bob actually scanned the message with his eyes.
It should be noted that a way for Bob to avoid revocation is for him (or a program written by him) to requests his mail so frequently from his MUA that there is never a chance for Alice to revoke a message. We say that Bob can avoid revocation, but that he cannot defeat revocation. That is, Bob cannot prevent Alice from revoking a message that he has not read. The second protocol in this paper provides a mechanism for Alice to detect attempts by Bob to avoid revocation. She can then take proper action, such as ceasing further communication with Bob.
The following are desirable requirements for an e-mail revocation system: Some of these requirements are easier to meet than others. We de ne three levels of e-mail revocation. In the rest of the paper, we provide solutions to the problem at each of these levels. As expected, solutions at the levels with the higher number or requirements come at a greater cost. In each section, we describe which requirements are met.
Infrastructure
The infrastructure assumptions are the most important in designing protocols for e-mail revocation. It is obvious that these protocols would be very easy to design if we had a full-blown public key infrastructure, where every party had valid copies of every other party's public keys. In fact, authentication protocols in the literature could be used to meet all of our goals.
However, it is unrealistic to assume that a public key infrastructure will exist any time soon. Our aim was to explore what could be achieved with little or no infrastructure. Our level 1 protocol assumes that there is absolutely no infrastructure. In level 2, we assume a weak form of infrastructure to achieve better security. Rather than assume that there is a universal certifying authority that everybody trusts to verify user's identities and to issue certi cates, we assume that there is a party that is trusted to keep secrets and behave appropriately. This is very di erent from trusting a CA. In particular, one of the most criticized aspects of public key infrastructure is that there is no way to be sure that CA's are competent in verifying users' identities. Thus, our trusted third party assumption is weaker than the public key infrastructure assumption. We call our third party an honest third party.
Thus, we present level 1 and level 2 protocols with increased security at the cost of greater assumptions. One advantage of this is that the level 1 protocol could be implemented right away. If, at some future date, there is more infrastructure available, then people could switch to level 2, and maybe even level 3. For the latter, we assume full public key infrastructure where all parties have each others' public keys. In this case, secure revocation of e-mail is a simpler problem.
Level 1
The level 1 system o ers e-mail revocation under weak assumptions. In particular, although requirement 7 is satis ed even if Alice or Bob cheat, requirements 1-3, 5 and 6 are only satis ed if all parties play by the rules. This type of system is useful for users who trust each other and want to have e-mail revocation as a convenient, useful service. It could also be e ective for unsophisticated users who would be unable to mount the attacks necessary to defeat the system. Today, most e-mail users fall into this category. Level 1 is especially suited for people whose mail service is LIM (see Section 2) because in this model, users cannot directly access their mail le, so they cannot defeat revocation by, say, reading their spool le directly.
We note that in the description of the protocol we assume in order delivery of mail messages. For instance, if a user sends an E-mail message and later revokes it by sending a revocation message then we assume the two messages arrive at the appropriate order. In practice, this is not necessarily the case, and future work is needed to account for messages that are received in the wrong order.
Security model
In level 1, we assume that the principals involved behave according to the prescribed protocol. If a party cheats, it can potentially defeat some of the security requirements. Figure 1 depicts a typical e-mail system. In level 1, we assume that Bob does not -eavesdrop on message 1 -access the spool le without MUA recording it -change the behavior of MUA We present a protocol where requirements 1-7 and 10 hold, under these assumptions. Requirement 9 holds until Bob actually reads M. At that point, Charlie and Donna will detect the noti cation message that is returned to Alice.
One of the features of our system is that Alice can send a query to MUA to see if Bob read M. Alice must be able to do this, while Charlie and Donna must not be able to generate a valid request to MUA. Donna can trivially cause M to be revoked (requirement 8) by modifying the original message, M, to contain nothing. Similarly,Donna can prevent Alice from successfully revoking a message by blocking the revocation request, and she can also tamper with noti cation messages (revocation successful, etc). Therefore, we assume that Donna will not behave this way. It should be noted that with the same behavior, Donna could cripple any existing mail system. Our system is not resistant to such a powerful attacker (nor is any mail system that we know).
The protocol
In the following protocol, we assume that f and h are cryptographically strong one-way functions. h is also a hash function, as it is applied to variable-length messages. f is applied to small, xed-length messages consisting of a random string and a short xed-size message. In practice, MD5 12] and DES 9] could be used to implement h and f, respectively. We also assume that each mail user agent (MUA) has a data structure called a revocation table, where it stores some useful information about messages it has received.
Step 1: send Alice sends a message to Bob's MUA.
{ Alice generates a random string, k. { Alice computes x = f(k; h(M)) and sends M; x to MUA. She then stores M and k for future use.
{ MUA checks for x in the revocation table, to make sure that this message is not a replay. If x is not found, then MUA stores M in a regular spool le. It then computes h(M), creates a revocation table entry, and stores x; h(M) there, with a pointer to M in the spool le. If x is found, then the message is a replay and it is logged and ignored. The result of Step 1 is illustrated in Figure 2 . Step 3: revoke Alice revokes the message, M.
{ Alice sends her current stored string, k (which may be di erent than the original k in step 1, if step 2 was executed) and x = f(k; h(M)) to MUA along with a keyword revoke. { Alice then removes M and k from her outbox. Step { Alice removes M and k from her outbox.
Security considerations
We now discuss the security concerns that shaped the protocol described above. The main concern is that a malicious eavesdropper, Charlie, should not be able to revoke a message sent by Alice (Goal 7). Furthermore, Charlie should not be able to check whether Alice's mail was read by Bob. We assume that Charlie may not alter messages in transit. However, he may read messages in transit and send new messages if he so desires. We begin by explaining why our protocol satis es Goal 7. We then move on to explain other aspects of the protocol. When Alice rst sends a message to Bob she picks a random key k. She then applies a one-way function to k and obtains x. We assume that given x it is intractable to determine k. This is a standard cryptographic assumption which is believed to be satis ed by various potential one-way functions 15]. Recall that Alice sends x along with the message M. Bob stores x in his revocation table. Since messages cannot be corrupted in transit the link between x and M cannot be broken by Charlie. Alice keeps the value k hidden in her private outbox. Since Alice is the only one who knows the value k she can prove ownership of the message M. On the other hand Charlie cannot determine the value k unless he is able to invert the one-way function.
The discussion above shows that in both the check and revoke steps Alice may prove ownership of the message M to Bob by revealing the secret key k. This prevents Charlie from either revoking or checking on a message belonging to Alice. Of course once the key k is revealed a new secret key must be generated. For this reason during the check step Alice generates a new secret key, k 0 , and sends its hash to Bob. This is in the same spirit as one time password systems 13] such as S/KEY TM 7] .
The protocol for checking whether a message has been read contains an interesting subtelty. Recall that after the message is read all information regarding the message is erased. At this point, one can not verify that the party performing the check is indeed the owner of the message. In other words, there is no way to prevent Charlie from learning the fact that a message has been read. Indeed, after the message is read, when Charlie performs a check he receives noti cation saying \the message has been seen". Before the message is read Charlie can not perform the check protocol since he does not possess the secret key k proving ownership of the message. However, observe that when Charlie runs through the check protocol using an invalid key the noti cation sent to him is still \the message has been seen". Consequently, the response Charlie receives gives him no information as to whether the message has been read or not. On the other hand, Alice, who knows the secret key k, will receive noti cation \the message has not been seen" when she performs a check before the message is read. Thus, by setting the reply messages appropriately we avoid the di culty in verifying ownership of the message after it has been read.
Notice that in Step 1 when Alice applies the one-way function to k she is actually evaluating the function x = f(k; h(M)). There are several reasons for including the hash of the message h(M) as input to the one-way function. Conceptually it creates a link between the message M and the secret key k. Furthermore, recall that the sender ID and the transmission time are parts of the message M (as SMTP headers). As a result the value x depends on those parameters as well.
Our protocol would run into unexpected behavior if two di erent messages hashed to the same value x. More precisely, we assume that two di erent pairs This concludes the security considerations in our protocol. We now discuss some weaknesses of this level 1 protocol. The protocol only works when both parties Alice and Bob play by the rules. On a DAM system (See section 2), Bob can easily interfere with his MUA and prevent messages from being revoked. For instance, a program written by Bob may periodically copy incoming messages from his spool le. Doing so will prevent the MUA from revoking messages. (This is not a problem in the LIM model.) In our level 2 protocol, even if Bob interferes with his MUA, he cannot prevent e-mail revocation. (We discuss this in Section 3.)
It should also be pointed that our system does not prevent mail message forgery. For instance, Charlie may prevent Alice from revoking a message by applying the following strategy: when Alice rst sends a message, Charlie records it. When Charlie notices that Alice chose to revoke the message he resends the recorded message to Bob pretending that it is actually sent from Alice. This way the original message is stored on Bob's machine as if it was sent from Alice. This replay attack in e ect prevents Alice from revoking the message. To prevent this attack one needs the ability to authenticate the identity of the sender. This is addressed in our level 3 protocol which assumes a public key infrastructure.
As a nal point we note that throughout the section we assume Alice has a secure pseudo-random number generator. That is, no third party can predict any of the bits generated by Alice's generator. See 5] for a discussion on how to generate secure random bits in software.
Implementation
We implemented the level 1 protocol. The implementation applies to the DAM model (e.g. UNIX systems), and we assume that all parties use the sendmail daemon.
Environmental Assumptions In our implementation Bob's MUA is sendmail, Mailx is the local mail delivery agent, and that Alice's MUA is a form of MH mail. We assume a standard Unix spool le; Each message begins with \From " and LF is used as a delimiter.
Program Overview The implementation is composed of a series of scripts.
Alice's scripts have two functions: attaching revocation headers to outgoing mail and sending check and revoke commands. Bob uses a mail lter script to verify and execute check and revoke commands.
Alice must initially generate a random seed and sequence number. To send a revocable message, Alice composes a message with a special -revoke argument which causes the mailer to compute x and attach revocation headers to the message draft. Alice's mailer then sends the message to Bob and saves a copy in her revoke folder. Additionally the secret key k is stored as a mail-header as part of the message in the revoke folder.
If a receiver is not con gured to accept revocable mail, revocation commands are simply appended to the spool le. Bob's spool le holds the incoming message, but if Alice generates a check or revoke request, Bob's local mail handler processes the request message instead of storing it in the spool le. If the revocable mail message has already been read, Alice is told that the message \has been read". Otherwise, Bob's mail lter will execute a script to perform the check or revoke. Alice is given the results of the request (eg, request succeeded).
Alice uses the traditional MH scan +revoke command to view revocable messages. She can scroll through the messages and look at the subject and the text of the messages. To execute steps 2 or 3 of the protocol, she issues a new command, either revoke send.pl check <msgs> or revoke send.pl revoke <msgs>. For users of xmh, it is trivial to add a button to the graphical user interface to`revoke' or`check' messages. For checks and revocations, Alice's mailer will send a message, \(check/revoke: k,x,y" to Bob, whose .forward and .maildelivery les will lter the message via slocal and eventually run the script associated with the request.
Design Rationale & Alternatives The protocol was implemented in Perl for two reasons. First, Perl has a powerful regular expression pattern matching mechanism. This is desirable since a signi cant amount of string comparisons are made. Second, Perl is portable to all modern UNIX operating systems. This allows the implementation to be used on multiple platforms without any tweaking.
The one minor disadvantage of using Perl is that the code must be reinterpretted each time Bob receives a revocation request and each time Alice sends revocable mail. 4 Using a compiled language such as C would win speedwise, but the recompilation and platform dependent issues are not worth it for this simple implementation.
Before choosing, MH, we brie y looked at BSD v.4 mailx (Mail) and pine v3.95. Both of these mailers proved to be hard to modify and monolithic in design. Instead of dealing with platform compatibility issues and source code patches, we chose MH mail because of it's modularity, popularity, and its many GUI's (mh-e, xmh, exmh) 10]. Our implementation is tailored to MH, but it serves the purpose of demonstrating a working protocol and exposing possible problems. Unlike most mailers (pine, elm, xmail, etc), each of MH's commands is a separate program run from the shell prompt. This modularity and the exibility of parameter les allow the revocation protocol to be implemented without recompiling any source code and giving the revocation routines a sense of transparency to the user.
The combination of MH's modularity and Perl's portability allow a user to seamlessly use the protocol on most UNIX machines. Furthermore, revocable email can be sent without needing system administrators.
Originally we considered placing a wrapper around sendmail, but this would have required tweaking the sendmail con guration. It was much easier to place the wrapper around MH mail, because unlike sendmail's harry con guration les, MH provides simple and convenient methods to add new functionality. Users can install and use the program more easily.
We shifted to the per-user revocation tables instead of the whole system tables. A large database of all revocable mail would require more infrastructure. The spool les for each user are natural places to store information.
De ning the actual message to hash turned out to be more di cult than expected because of many details speci c to SMTP 11] . An encapsulation mechanism similar to PGP ASCII armour 1] was considered, but we wanted the presence of cryptography to be less visible to the user. Instead of mandating special message delimiters, we took the more complicated approach of specifying exactly what constitutes a message body and headers. This does not entirely solve the problem, but for the most part, messages are interpreted the same on both the sending and receiving side.
Sendmail and other MUA's place a \>" in front of each instance of \From", followed by a space, at the start of a line in the message body. This can cause problems as the body to be hashed changes during the transfer. For example, the message body in: To thwart this, the revocation process adds the \>" before sending the message, thereby preventing the MUA from changing anything. Another problem is that addresses may have domain names appended by sendmail. The capitalization and whitespace will vary from sender to receiver. Thus, we had to be very careful to only hash elds that do not change in transit.
Spool les composition is not de ned by an Internet standard. Delimiters vary from LF's (mailx) to several C-A's (MDDF). Messages typically begin with \From " and end with a LF. But Bob's revocation process needs to know what delimits the message. We assume that the mailx local delivery program is used. By default, messages are separated by LF's.
Module Descriptions deslib.perl contains Dennis Ferguson's implementation of DES routines and string2key.
revokelib.pl contains many lower-level cryptographic routines used by other scripts. It is the sole program to decide how to hash a message. The key generation routines are contained here: a new key is generated by taking the output of a DES encryption on the sequence number with the random seed. The sequence number is then incremented and stored with the new key in .revoke. revoke init.pl creates the initial random seed and sequence number for Alice. The seed is generated by folding an input string and a function of the machine state into a DES key by the Kerberos v4 string-to-key function. The seed and the sequence number zero are then stored in Alice's /Mail/.revoke le.
Alice uses revoke header.pl to attach special headers to an MH draft le. The required \to" header and optional \subject" header are saved in the draft, but the \date" and the \from" headers are inserted later in the transfer process.
We store the information contained in the revocation table (see Figure 2 ) as mail-headers embedded in the message. For instance, when Alice sends a message to Bob she embeds the header X-Revoke-Hash: x in the message.
To send a revocable/checkable message, the headers:
X-Revoke-Date: <DATE-AND-TIME> X-Revoke-Hash: <ENCRYPTED-HASH> must be in the mail header. This will instruct the receiving end that this message can be checked for delivery and revoked from the spool le. A copy of the message with the additional X-Revoke-Key: <key> header is placed in Alice's revoke folder. The string to be hashed is de ned as the concatenation of the X-Revoke-From eld body, X-Revoke-Date eld body, subject eld body, and the message body. Known Problems In our current implementation, messages with multiple recipients cannot be revoked. Some modi cations to check/revoke script are needed. We plan to implement this soon.
This implementation does not work with the MH drafts folder. The program deals only with single draft les (eg, Mail/draft). Finally, we do not use le locking. A robust implementation would require this for multiple revocations to take place concurrently.
Noti cation programs such as bi and xbi display information to the user that he has a message, sometimes including the rst few lines of the message. Implementations of revocation should take these into account. In our current implementation, we do nothing to prevent noti cation programs from displaying this information.
Level 2
This section presents a more secure protocol for revoking electronic mail.
Security model
In level 2, we assume the existence of an honest third party, T, and that senders and receivers do not necessarily trust each other. Our security requirement is that as long as T follows the protocol, then requirements 1-5,7,9-10 of Section 3 are met. We do not protect against Donna, an active attacker who can modify messages in transit. However, requirement 8 holds as long as Donna does not modify the message at the time it is sent. Also, in the DAM model, requirement 6 cannot be met.
We do not assume that there is an existing relationship between the sender, the receiver or T. Therefore, we cannot defend against somebody impersonating T by, say, spoo ng DNS. The level 3 protocol defends against these attacks (see Section 7). The main di erence between level 2 and level 1 is that even if Bob tries to cheat, he will not be able to defeat the security requirements. Level 2 is especially well suited for the DAM model.
The honest third party
We specify an honest third party, T, as opposed to a trusted third party because this party is only trusted to behave honestly, follow a protocol and not reveal its secrets. The term trusted third party is generally used to refer to a party that is trusted to verify identities and issue statements binding entities to keys. Our assumptions about T are weaker.
T consists of two services that could be o ered by separate entities (if necessary). The rst service is a mix that is used to protect messages from tra c analysis. This concept was rst proposed by Chaum 4] , and an example of such a system is BABEL 6], which also allows users to send anonymous mail with anonymous return addresses. The purpose of the mix is to prevent Bob from using tra c analysis to subvert requirement 5.
The second role of T is to provide a server, S, that can be trusted to store secret keys that are only released under the right conditions. For greater reliability and availability, this service could be distributed to several machines using secret sharing and threshold schemes 14]. Both the mix and the server may consist of any number of geographically dispersed machines.
Infrastructure assumption
In level 2, we assume that there is no existing relationship between Alice and Bob (i.e. no shared secrets or public keys). In addition, whenever Alice sends a message to Bob, Charlie sees everything that was sent. Therefore, there is nothing that can di erentiate Charlie from Bob from the point of view of the secure server. Our protocol requires Bob to request a decryption key from the honest server in order to read messages. Since there is nothing that Bob can do that Charlie cannot do, Charlie can make the same request to the honest server. Thus, Charlie can cause the honest server to mistakenly believe that Bob has read a message.
The only way to prevent Charlie from impersonating Bob to the honest server is to assume that Bob can somehow authenticate himself to the honest server. To do this, we assume a small amount of infrastructure. In particular, we require that each site register a secret key, w, with the honest server S (the second service provided by T). This is not such a great burden considering that an administrator will have to upgrade the mail software anyway to use our protocol. Users need not be aware that there is a site-speci c secret key shared with S.
As mentioned in Section 2, the MUA in the LIM model and the mail daemon in the DAM model are trusted. Therefore, we assume that the mail daemon in either case can be trusted with secrets, such as w, that it can keep from the users.
The protocol
In the following protocol, f; h, and MUA are de ned as in section 5.2; Mix and S are the two components of the honest third party as de ned in Section 6.2. And w is the secret key shared by the trusted component of Bob's MUA and S. k; k 0 ; and k 00 are random strings generated by Alice, and fMg k represents the message, M, encrypted under key k with a symmetric cipher. When M is encrypted, the entire message, including the headers that direct the message to Bob, is encrypted. Then, new headers are added that direct the message to a special address at Bob's MUA, where it is processed appropriately. This ensures that each message will be unique because it will have information such as the date, time, sender and receiver.
The following protocol is explained in detail in the subsequent section:
Step Figure 4 . MUA has access to this revocation table. Clearly the server S is also capable of computing y. When Bob requests the decryption key k from S he authenticates himself by sending S the value y.
We claim that Charlie cannot determine the value y and consequently he cannot fool S into sending him the key k. This will prove the validity of S's reply in Step 2 of the protocol and the correctness of the receipt sent back to Alice in Step 4. Observe that during previous invocations of the protocol Charlie observes the values y 1 = f(w; h(fM 1 g k )); : : :; y n = f(w; h(fM n g k )) for messages M 1 ; : : :; M n . Since h is collision secure we may assume that h(fM 1 g k ); : : :; h(fM n g k ); h(fMg k ) are distinct. Charlie then has to compute the value y = f(w; h(fMg k )) where M is the current message. Since f is a symmetric block cipher this is equivalent to decrypting the cipher-text h(fMg k ) given the set of plain-text/cipher-text pairs (y 1 ; h(fM n g k )); : : :. By de nition, this cannot be done if f is a secure block cipher. Consequently, Charlie cannot fool S into thinking he is Bob. This proves that Goals 4 and 10 are fully satis ed.
When Alice chooses to revoke a message, she sends a noti cation to the server S asking it to erase the encryption key. By doing so the encrypted message sent earlier to Bob is now useless. In other words, Bob will never be able to read Alice's message. It follows that if Alice revokes her message, Bob will not be able to read the message. Hence, Goal 2 is satis ed Our level 2 protocol requires the use of an honest server S to store encryption keys k. The storage requirements of the honest server are quite low. One may avoid using an honest server by making Alice the honest server. That is, when Bob wishes to read his mail he contacts Alice and asks for the decryption key. We avoid this design for several reasons, primarily for availability. It is quite likely that Bob may wish to read his mail when Alice's server is down. Without a trusted server, Bob would have to wait for Alice to come back on-line.
Level 3
In level 3, we assume that there is a public key infrastructure. Minimally, that means that the public key of some trusted authority is shared by all, and that the trusted authority has issued public key certi cates for all parties. In practice, the only important thing is that each party has a valid copy of every other party's public key. To date, systems requiring a public key infrastructure do not scale well. The problem is that neither the PEM model 2] nor the PGP model 17] are acceptable as global solutions. In the PEM model, there is a strict certi cation hierarchy. There are two problems with this model. One is that there are many people who are unwilling to trust a single root of the certi cation tree. The other problem is that some certi cation authorities may be more competent than others at certifying their users.
In the PGP model, people are responsible for maintaining their own set of others that they trust. Trust can propagate based on transitive trust. The PGP model does not scale because di erent people have di erent ideas of when the transitive relationship should hold.
The level 3 system has advantages over levels 1 and 2 because all messages can be signed as authentic and encrypted for con dentiality. Revocation is easier because every message can be authenticated. However, level 3 solutions can only be adopted on an Intranet or Communities of Interest (COI) scale. The protocols for this level could be easily built using existing technology.
Conclusions
This paper describes the security requirements for adding several new features to electronic mail. These features allow users to revoke message that they have previously sent, receive noti cation when messages are read, and check to see if messages have been seen yet. Careful analysis shows why the security properties of our protocols hold.
In the level 1 system, we assume that all parties comply with the rules of the protocol. This is natural and enforceable in the LIM model. Level 2 protocols are designed to withstand users who try to cheat, at the cost of requiring an honest third party and a weak infrastructure assumption. This protocol is designed for DAM systems. The level 3 protocol is described at a very high level as it is not applicable in the Internet until the public key infrastructure problem is solved.
We implemented the level 1 protocol.
